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ABSTRACT
The present study has two general purposes. First, based on the
compensation strategy literature, we examine the extent to which
organizations facing similar conditions make different managerial
compensation decisions regarding base pay, bonus pay, and eligibility
for long-term incentives. Second, working from expectancy and agency
theory perspectives, we explore the consequences of these decisions for
subsequent firm performance as measured by return on assets. Using
longitudinal data on approximately 16,000 top and middle level managers
and 200 organizations, significant between-organization differences in
compensation decisions are found. The smallest organization effects
are on the level of base pay. The largest organization effects are on
bonus levels and eligibility for long-term incentives. In other words,
our results suggest that organizations tend to distinguish themselves
through decisions about pay contingency or variability rather than
through decisions about the level of base pay. To study consequences,
residualized measures (adjusted for employee and job factors) of
organization pay level and pay mix are used. Pay level is not
associated with organization financial performance. On the other hand,
greater contingency of pay in the form of bonuses and long-term
incentives is associated with better financial performance.
We thank John Abowd, Frederick Cook, Lee Dyer, Ron Ehrenberg, John
Fossum, Paul Gobat, Erica Groshen, Chalmer Labig, Sara Rynes, and Dave
Ulrich for helpful comments on an earlier draft and the Cornell Center
for Advanced Human Resource Studies for funding.
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ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN MANAGERIAL
COMPENSATION AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
A fundamental assumption of much of the compensation literature is
that organizations have considerable discretion in the design of pay
policies and that such choices have consequences for organization
performance (Foulkes, 1980; Lawler, 1981; Milkovich & Newman, 1987;
Milkovich, 1988; Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1988). As such,
organizations that are similar in terms of types of employees and jobs,
product market, size, and so on may choose compensation system designs
that differ in their effectiveness in attaining the same goals. Little
is known, however, about the extent or magnitude of such design
differences, their nature (e.g. pay mix choices may distinguish
organizations more than pay level choices), their determinants, or
their implications for firm performance (Ehrenberg & Milkovich, 1987).
Our study provides evidence on these issues, by examining both the
determinants and consequences (for financial performance) of
organization differences in pay level and pay mix among a national
sample of top and middle level managers. Pay mix is measured as the
extent to which pay is given in the form of short term bonuses, long
term incentives, and base salary. Taken together, these three
components determine pay level (excluding benefits).
DETERMINANTS OF COMPENSATION
Employee and Job Characteristics
Although our focus is on identifying and explaining organization
effects on compensation, it is first necessary to incorporate in our
model the compensation determinants that have received the most
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emphasis in previous theory and research--employee and job
characteristics. Otherwise, what appear to be organization effects may
actually reflect organization differences in types of employees and
jobs.
Human capital theory (Becker, 1975) identifies several employee
attributes associated with (lifetime) earnings. Among the most
important are those that reflect investments in training (e.g. formal
education, on-the-job training). Consistent with the theory, empirical
evidence shows that more years of education and labor market experience
explain much of the variance in individual pay levels (e.g Mincer,
1974). The theory also specifies that cognitive ability, a strong
predictor of job performance (e.g. Hunter & Hunter, 1984), increases
pay because the more capable acquire training at less cost.
Despite the importance of personal characteristics, organizations
also devote much effort to attaching pay rates to jobs, as evidenced by
the focus on jobs in the administrative literature (e.g., Livernash,
1957; Schwab, 1980, Milkovich & Newman, 1987; Belcher & Atchinson,
1987) and in theoretical models of job competition (Thurow, 1975) and
internal labor markets (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Williamson, Wachter, &
Harris, 1975). Gerhart and Milkovich (1989), for example, found in a
large sample of exempt employees that the R2 for base pay increased
from 30% (using human capital variables) to 80% when job level was
added.
Although much less theory on the determinants of pay mix is
available, one might argue that the higher in the organization
hierarchy the job, the greater potential impact on organization
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION
4
performance an employee is likely to have. In expectancy theory terms,
there is also more likely to be a perceived link between effort and
(organization) performance. Because of this stronger link, there may
be more opportunity to use bonuses and long-term incentives among
higher level managers. As discussed later, agency theory would also
predict greater use of contingent compensation at higher levels where
jobs are less programmable.
Hierarchical level is likely to be an important, but imperfect
indicator of both impact and programmability. For example, a research
scientist may have few (if any) directly reporting hierarchical levels.
However, the work is often low in programmability and high in terms of
potential consequences for organization performance. In this example
and others, a key factor is the amount of training investment in the
employee. Higher human capital investments in the form of education
and experience are likely to be associated with less programmability
and greater potential impact on organization performance. As discussed
above, expectancy theory and agency theory predict that these factors
will be associated with greater use of contingent pay.
In summary, based on the preceding discussion, we propose the
following general hypotheses:
H1a: Base pay level is positively related to employee human
capital investment and job responsibility level.
H1b: Pay mix is positively related to employee human capital
investment and job responsibility level.
Organization Variables
After one accounts for organization differences in employee and
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job characteristics, do organizations differ in their pay level and pay
mix? According to standard economic theories of competitive markets
(e.g., human capital theory; compensating wage differentials theory,
Smith, 1937), the answer is "no", at least with respect to pay level.
Employers are seen as price-takers, meaning that they must pay the
"going rate" if they are to be competitive. If they pay less, they
will not be able to attract a sufficient number of qualified employees.
If they pay more, their higher costs will drive them out of business.
These competitive forces dictate that any deviations from the going
rate must be transitory. Thus, from this theoretical perspective,
there is little room for employer differences in compensation policies.
Case studies by "post-institutional" (Segal, 1986) economists
during the 1940s and 1950s, however, suggested that there was no single
going rate of pay across organizations for most occupations and that
these organization differences could not be explained entirely by
employee and job differences (e.g., Lester, 1946; Reynolds, 1946;
Dunlop, 1957). For example, Dunlop reported substantial pay
differentials across employers for a single job (truckdrivers) in a
single geographic area (Boston). Explanations for such organization
differences typically centered on custom (or historical precedent) and
ability to pay (Segal, 1986). For example, an employer that had
expanded during a tight labor market might have chosen to raise pay
levels to attract a sufficient number of quality employees. Later,
these high pay levels might no longer have been necessary for
attraction and retention. Yet, they have come to be accepted as proper
(e.g., compared to other organizations) and the employer might choose
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not to attempt to change the organization's relative pay level (i.e.,
its position in Dunlop's "wage contour"), especially if ability to pay
is high. In any case, the important implication of the post-
institutionalists' work is that market forces do not completely
eliminate employer discretion in setting pay level policies.
Hore recent examinations of organization differences in pay levels
have sought to improve on the early case studies by more systematically
estimating the relative influence of organization, job, and employee
effects on pay. Somewhat conflicting findings have emerged. For
example, Leonard (1988), based on findings from a single industry
(California electronics firms), concluded that "firms that deviate from
the average (market) wage, tend to return towards the market wage" (p.
28). In other words, he argued that organization differences in pay
levels were transitory and random, consistent with classical economic
theory, and inconsistent with sustained differences in organization pay
strategies. In contrast, Groshen (1988) found that organization
differences in pay level were both important and highly stable over
time, suggesting differences in pay level strategies.
The Leonard (1988) and Groshen (1988) studies, however, have
limitations. First, and perhaps most important, neither examined pay
mix. Although market forces compel a degree of uniformity in pay
levels, it is not clear that market forces have an analagous effect on
pay mix. Therefore, organizations may have considerably more
discretion in setting pay mix policies or strategies. As discussed
later, expectancy theory and agency theory clearly predict that some
pay mix policies will be more effective than others.
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Second, neither study controlled for employee characteristics,
leaving open the possibility that organization pay level differences
were a result of different levels of human capital. Third, both
studies focused largely on lower level occupations (mostly blue-collar
and nonsupervisory white-collar). Despite these limitations, the
studies suggest that there may be important pay level differences
between organizations. As discussed below, such organization effects
may arise, for example, because of differences in industry, size,
financial performance, or strategy. However, before considering these
explanations in more depth, it is useful to first establish whether
there are, in fact, net organization effects on base pay level.
Consistent with previous theory and research, we hypothesize that:
H2a: Organizations will exhibit differences in base pay level,
controlling for personal and job characteristics.
Although there does not appear to have been any comprehensive
theoretical or empirical research regarding pay mix differences across
organizations, evidence from various sources suggests such differences
may be substantial. For example, surveys show that the use of profit
sharing, lump sum bonuses, gain sharing, and other practices related to
pay mix vary across organizations, industries, and occupations (O'Dell,
1987; Conference Board, 1989). Although organization conditions
matter, as with pay level, it is usually argued that managers have
discretion in designing their pay mix (Lawler, 1981; Milkovich &
Newman, 1987). As discussed below, organization effects may arise
because of differences in industry, size, financial performance, or
strategy. As with pay level, however, we wish to first test for
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION
8
organization effects on pay mix before considering possible
explanations in greater depth. We hypothesize that:
H2b: Organizations will exhibit differences in pay mix,
controlling for personal and job characteristics.
If organization differences in pay level and mix remain after
removing the effects of employee and job factors, the implication is
that theories focusing only on employee and job attributes are
insufficient. The next step then would be to examine how well the
general organization effect can be explained by specific organization
factors such as industry, size, and financial performance, which are
additional factors incorporated by some economic research, and by
contingency theories.
Industry. Economic research by Krueger and Summers (1986, 1988)
demonstrates significant industry effects on pay level that have been
stable over time. Consistent with Dunlop (1957), Mahoney (1979)
explains such effects as a consequence of the fact that organizations
in a particular industry "encounter similar constraints of technology,
raw materials, product demand, and pricing" (p. 122) that provide a
constraint on ability to pay.
In terms of pay mix, industries with greater variations in product
demand and higher ratios of labor costs to revenues may be more likely
to make a greater percentage of pay variable. Also, industry may act
as a proxy for other organization characteristics (e.g., union power,
research and development focus) potentially related to pay mix aside
from those discussed below.
Organization size. Sales volume and the number of employees are
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positively related to pay level (Mellow, 1982). One explanation is
that larger firms have both a higher ability to pay and a greater need
for high quality employees. Efficiency wage theories, for example,
argue that worker "shirking" is more of a problem in large firms
because it is more difficult to monitor each worker's performance.
Thus, higher pay levels may be used to permit more stringent hiring
standards. One hypothesis is that a higher pay level reduces shirking
because employees realize they would be unlikely to find another job
that pays as well (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984). A recent study by Brown
and Medoff (1989) found that higher labor quality in large firms does
help explain why they pay more (see also Evans & Leighton, 1989). On
the other hand, the monitoring explanation was not supported. Thus,
the question of why large firms hire better quality employees remains
to be answered.
Fixed costs of any kind introduce financial risk (Brealey & Myers,
1981). For small firms, where slack resources are less prevalent,
fixed costs are of special concern. As such, there may be less
emphasis on base salary. In addition, if growth is a major objective,
capital investments are likely to be a top priority, placing heavy
demands on cash flow in the near term, again limiting base salary.
However, long-term incentives that have the potential for a substantial
payoff if such growth is achieved may be used (Ellig, 1981).
Financial performance. Firms with higher accounting profits
(Deckop, 1988), sales growth (Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988), and
shareholder wealth growth (Murphy, 1985; Baker et al.) have been found
to pay their chief executive officers more. But, the magnitude of such
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relations sometimes seems "small" (e.g. Baker et al. report that a
$1,000 change in shareholder wealth corresponded to a $0.02 change in
CEO salary plus bonus), or nonexistent (Kerr & Bettis, 1987). In cases
where organization performance is related to pay, the latter is often
higher because of bonus payouts. In this case, the pay mix typically
changes such that the ratio of bonus to base pay is greater. We
hypothesize that:
H3a: Organization effects on base pay level are related to
differences in industry, size, and financial performance.
H3b: Organization effects on pay mix are related to differences in
industry, size, and financial performance.
Strategy
To the degree that compensation differences between organizations
remain after accounting for employee and job differences, and these
compensation differences are not due to the observable organization
factors examined above (industry, size, financial performance), the
implication is that even similar organizations may engage in different
compensation practices. Are these different practices largely a result
of chance variations or are they indicative of different compensation
strategies?
Pearce and Robinson (1982) describe as strategic those decisions
that (a) require top management involvement, (b) entail allocation of
large amounts of company resources, (c) have major consequences for
multiple businesses or functions, (d) are future-oriented, (e) require
consideration of external environment factors, and (e) have an impact
on the long-term performance of the organization. The fact that
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compensation typically accounts for 20% to 50% of total operating
expenses (Milkovich & Newman, 1987) and has implications for
attraction, retention, and performance motivation across business units
and functional areas (and thus perhaps organization performance)
suggests that certain compensation decisions are likely to take on
strategic properties.
The literature on compensation strategy suggests that decisions
regarding pay level and pay mix, for example, are strategic because
they meet many of the same criteria outlined by Pearce and Robinson
( 1982 ) . In contrast, other compensation decisions are less likely to
be strategic. For example, decisions concerning relatively narrow
tactical questions such as the choice between various job evaluation
systems or performance appraisal instruments, are less likely to be
considered strategic (Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1988; Milkovich, 1988).
In measuring strategy, although both intentions and actions are
relevant, the correspondence between the two is not necessarily high
(Mintzberg, 1978, 1987; Snow & Hambrick, 1980). In compensation,
actions, rather than intentions or plans, are likely to have the
greater consequences for costs and behaviors. Thus, consistent with
business strategy measurement approaches that focus on the content
outcome of the strategy process (e.g., Hofer & Schendel, 1978;
Chrisman, Hofer, & Boulton, 1988), we focus on "realized" pay
strategies. These are indicated "when a sequence of decisions in some
area exhibits consistency over time" (Mintzberg, 1978, p. 935; see also
Miles & Snow, 1978). In other words, for organization effects to have
strategic properties, they should be stable over time.
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As discussed earlier, a common theme in the compensation
literature is that organizations have considerable discretion in the
design of pay policies (Foulkes, 1980; Lawler, 1981; Milkovich, 1988;
Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1988). As such, we would expect to see even
similar organizations following different compensation practices.
Further, with longitudinal data, it is possible to test whether such
differences represent transitory chance deviations, or instead stable
organization differences. Using Mintzberg's definition, such stability
would be consistent with organization differences in compensation
strategies. We hypothesize that:
H4a: Organization differences in base pay level not explained by
personal and job characteristics will be stable over time,
suggesting different base pay level strategies.
H4b: Organization differences in pay mix not explained by personal
and job characteristics will be stable over time, suggesting
different pay mix strategies.
An important question that has been overlooked in the literature
concerns the relative magnitude of organization effects on pay level
and pay mix. Baker et al. (1988), for example, argue that "widely
accepted compensation surveys are ultimately self-perpetuating" and
"inherently counterproductive" because the reporting of only pay levels
tends to "encourage...compensation schemes that are independent of
performance" (p. 610). If so, there should be greater consistency in
pay levels across organizations than in other aspects of compensation
such as bonuses and long term incentives.
Another reason to expect larger organization differences in pay
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mix (versus pay level) practices is that large changes in pay mix have
the potential to be cost neutral. In contrast, although changes (e.g.,
increases) in pay level may have positive consequences, the most
immediate and visible consequence is an increase in costs. As such,
organizations may feel more pressure to be consistent with their
competitors on the pay level dimension.
Consistent with these arguments, a recent survey of "leading edge"
firms (Hewitt, 1989) found greater consistency in articulated policies
concerning pay level (versus mix). In the popular business strategy
literature (e.g., Peters, 1987; Kanter, 1989), many of the
recommendations concerning compensation tend to focus on making pay
more variable and contingent on various measures of performance. The
implication may be that pay mix is "where the action is" in terms of
organization differences.
In summary, we expect larger organization effects on pay mix than
on pay level. In addition, size, industry, and financial performance
should explain less of the organization effect on pay mix (versus pay
level) because even highly similar organization may have different
strategies regarding the basis on which their employees are paid.
HiS: Organization effects on pay mix will be larger and less
attributable to industry, size, and financial performance
differences than organization effects on base pay level.
Although we focus on realized strategy, corroborative evidence in
the form of intentions would be useful. Organizations often do have
stated policies about both pay level and mix. For example, Foulkes
(1980, cited in Rynes & Milkovich, 1986) reported the following stated
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pay level policies as typical of those found in large, nonunion firms:
'to be above the market; to be in the top 10%; ...to be in the 65th
percentile nationally' (pp. 80-81). In addition, Weber and Rynes
(1990), using a policy-capturing design, found that compensation
managers who reported that their organizations followed a market pay
leadership strategy assigned higher pay rates to hypothetical jobs.
Pay mix would seem just as likely to result from conscious decisions
given the administrative demands and lack of employee acceptance
sometimes encountered with changes in such programs. Although data
limitations prevent us from examining stated pay mix policies, we can
examine stated pay level policies. We expect differences in the latter
to demonstrate convergent validity with the stable patterns of pay
level practices that we may identify.
H6: Organization differences in pay level not explained by
personal, job or specific organization characteristics will
correlate with stated pay level policies.
CONSEQUENCES FOR ORGANIZATION PERFORMANCE
Although there is little empirical evidence, it is generally
believed that pay practices have implications for organization
performance (Ehrenberg & Milkovich, 1987). In fact, consistent with
Pearce and Robinson's (1982) general description of strategic decisions
above, compensation decisions are seen as strategic to the extent they
have consequences for organization success (e.g. Milkovich, 1988;
Gomez-Mejia & Welbourne, 1988). Such consequences may result from the
effects of pay practices on behavioral or cost objectives. Note that
pay level and pay mix may influence these objectives in different ways.
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Pay Level
In terms of behavioral objectives, pay level may have the most
direct effect on attraction and retention. For example, as discussed
earlier, some firms (e.g. large ones) may choose to follow a high pay
level strategy to attract a larger applicant pool and allow greater
selectivity in hiring and retention decisions (Bronfenbrenner, 1956;
Rynes & Barber, forthcoming). Expectancy theory suggests that
applicant choice is influenced by the expected probability of receiving
valent outcomes such as pay. Current employees decisions about whether
to remain with the employer can be explained in a similar fashion. In
addition, pay level plays an important role in both equity theory and
discrepancy models of pay satisfaction. Perceived inequity and low pay
satisfaction are associated with voluntary turnover (Heneman, 1985).
In terms of cost objectives, perhaps the most visible impact of a
high pay level strategy is the increase in short-run labor costs.
However, in determining cost effectiveness or longer-run consequences
for firm performance, one must also consider whether a higher pay level
directly reduces other costs (e.g. search costs, required staffing
levels) or increases benefits through its beneficial impact on
behavioral objectives (e.g. attraction and retention).
In summary, the theoretical effect of pay level strategy is
unclear due to the many trade-offs involved. However, keeping in mind
that our study focuses on the highest job levels (and thus, crucial
employees), the positive effects of higher pay levels on managerial
quality should have important consequences for organization
performance. Thus, we hypothesize that:
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H7: Higher base pay levels are associated with better
organization performance.
Pay Mix
Both the psychological and finance literatures specify important
motivational (and thus behavioral) consequences of pay mix. For
example, in expectancy theory terms, motivation is expected to increase
to the extent that the instrumentality of a behavior for achieving
valent outcomes is high. A key question concerns the direction of the
motivation desired. Compensation practices are designed in the belief
that different degrees of emphasis on individual, group, and
organization objectives will affect employee behaviors accordingly.
Whatever the objective, expectancy theory argues that instrumentalities
of accomplishing these objectives for pay (and thus motivation to
achieve them) are increased by making pay contingent on their
attainment. Merit pay plans, as well as individual, group, and
organizational incentives offer ways of moving away from a strategy of
regular increments to base salary (e.g. announced across the board
increases) in favor of a strategy where pay varies as a function of the
achievement of objectives. In the case of organization or unit
incentive plans, the goal is to encourage cooperation and communication
between interdependent employees or groups (Lawler, 1981).
In the economics and finance literatures, agency theory starts
with the assumption that the interests of principals (i.e. owners) and
agents (i.e. managers) are not ordinarily the same. As jobs become
less programmable (Eisenhardt, 1988), the principal may encounter
growing difficulties in determining whether the agent is pursuing the
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principal's goals. To better align the goals (and presumably
behaviors) of the agents with those of the owners, the theory suggests
that compensation of managers will be made contingent on firm
performance (Eaton & Rosen, 1983). Thus, both expectancy theory and
agency theory emphasize the importance of making pay contingent on the
desired outcomes. The executive compensation literature (Murphy, 1985;
Baker et al., 1988) provides some support for this link. Moreover,
firms with dominant stockholders (versus "management-controlled firms")
seem to exhibit stronger links between compensation and financial
returns (Gomez-Mejia, Tosi & Hinkin, 1987; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989).
Regarding the cost objective, organization (or unit) incentive
plans are often viewed as offering a means of supporting the strategy
of making labor more of a variable than a fixed cost. The latter
increases as the base salary component of total pay increases. In
contrast, if a portion of employee pay is tied to the business
performance of the firm, labor costs will be lower in years when the
firm has less of an ability to pay and higher during years where the
ability to pay is higher and where the organization wishes to recognize
employees for their role in its success. Note that over time, the use
of variable pay does not necessarily affect pay level.
In summary, expectancy theory and agency theory point to the
positive effects of variable pay on behavioral objectives. Similarly,
variable pay is well-suited to achieving the cost objective of reducing
fixed labor costs, especially important during periods of low product
demand. We hypothesize that:
He: Higher proportions of variable pay (i.e. pay mix) are
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associated with better organization performance.
METHOD
Sample
A large well-known compensation consulting firm provided survey
data collected during 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985, pertaining to
over 20,000 top and middle level executives and managers in over 300
business units and firms in each year. Roughly 95% designated
themselves as freestanding companies. The consulting firm collected
the data by sending a questionnaire each year to each organization
asking that data on a representative sample of jobs, managerial levels,
and business units be provided. Each organization was encouraged to
report data on at least 75 incumbents and most did so.
The job families in the survey covered a broad range (e.g. top
executives, profit center heads, legal, employee relations,
manufacturing, marketing, finance, government relations, information
systems, research and development/engineering, planning/acquisitions,
general management, and materials). As an example of the range of
positions within job families, in employee relations, data were
collected on jobs ranging from the top personnel executive (1985
average pay
=
$96,704) down to personnel manager (a generalist under
direct supervision of the top personnel executive, 1985 average pay =
$60,821).
Analyses and Measures
Organization Effects on Individual Pay. To be included, an
organization had to report data for at least 3 of the 5 years surveyed.
In addition, only organizations in industries with 3 or more firms were
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included. These restrictions resulted in approximately 14,000
individuals per year, for a total sample of 70,684 individuals
(employed in 219 organizations).
Dependent variables were managerial base pay, the use of long-
term incentives (1
=
yes, 0 = no)1, and the ratio of bonus to base pay.
The latter two measures are designed to capture important aspects of
pay mix. All variables measured in dollars were scaled in 1980 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index.
Human capital (HC) variables included years of education, years of
potential labor market experience (age - years of education - 6)2, firm
tenure, job tenure, and squared terms for the latter three variables,
consistent with human capital theory's prediction of diminishing
returns to experience (negative signs on the squared terms).
Job characteristics (JOBCHAR) measures were (a) the number of
reporting levels from the board of directors to the position of the
incumbent, and (b) the number of management levels supervised.
Organization effects were measured using a dummy variable for each
firm. Specific organization characteristics were size (firm sales,
business unit sales, total employees), return on assets (ROA),3 and
Industry. The last was measured as the 2-digit SIC code of the firm.
As noted, only industries with at least 3 firms were included in the
sample. However, several of the 2-digit industries were further broken
down into 3-digit SIC codes because of diversity within the industry
and a sufficient number of firms within each 3-digit industry.4
The following equations were estimated:
Y:lt = Z;t.tA + eit (1)
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Yit = ZitA + XitB + eit (2)
Yit = ZitA + WitC + eit (3)
where Y is a vector of observations on a compensation dependent
variable for i persons at time t (i.e. data are pooled across years), Z
is a matrix of observations on individual and job control variables, X
is a vector of dummy variables representing organizations, W is a
matrix of specific organization characteristics (industry, size,
financial performance), A, B, and C are coefficient vectors, and e is
an error term that includes unmeasured causes of Y.
Our approach was to take the increment in R2 moving from equation
(1) to (2) as indicative of the general organization effect. Then, by
comparing this increment with that obtained by moving from equation (1)
to (3) we were able to determine the extent to which the overall
organization effect was due to industry, size, and financial
performance.
Stability and Convergent Validity. Because the data cover a 5-
year period, the first important evidence of stability in pay practices
would be provided by a significant effect of the organization dummy
variables in equation 1. However, a second approach was to focus on
organizations that provided data in both 1981 and 1985 (N
=
137).
Equation (1) was estimated using 1981 data and then using 1985 data.
The individual employee pay outcome residuals were averaged separately
for each organization in each year. These adjusted averages were taken
as indicative of the organization's relative position regarding base,
bonus/base, and long-term incentive usage in each year. Thus, for
example, if the average residual from the base pay equation was
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positive for a particular organization in a given year, it was
interpreted as being above the market defined by the organizations in
the survey that year. Stability was examined by correlating these 1981
and 1985 adjusted averages.
Convergent validity was examined by correlating the average
residual (based on equation 3, but using base + bonus as the dependent
variable) with the self-reported pay level policy. The latter was also
part of the consulting firm survey. Each organization was asked "how
do you define your target pay level" (below the median, at the median,
between the median and the 75th percentile, at the 75th percentile,
above the 75th percentile). Because not all organizations provided
self-reports (and because such data were not collected prior to 1983),
the sample size for this analysis was reduced to 124 organizations.
Consequences for Organization Performance. The performance
dependent variable was ROA. Given that short-run bonuses are designed
to have their most direct impact on short term business performance,
the relation of ROA in year t with the bonus/base ratio and base pay in
year t-1 was examined. As above, both compensation variables were
measured using average residuals from equation (1). The model was:
ROAit = ZitF + BaSeit-1C + (BonUSit-1/Baseit-1)D + eit. (4)
where t is the year, Z is a matrix of control variables (industry or
prior ROA), C, D, and F are coefficient vectors, and e is an error
term.
If greater contingency in compensation strategy has the effects
hypothesized by expectancy and agency theories, D should be positive
and statistically significant. Note that by including both base and
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bonus payments, overall pay level is controlled and the coefficients on
each variable indicate the relative effect of money allocated to base
versus bonus.
Different specifications of Z were used to address different
questions. For example, to estimate the relation between ROA and
compensation practices within industry, dummies for the latter were
included. To examine the relation, controlling for prior
profitability, Z included ROA in year t-Z. As discussed later,
however, controlling for prior ROA may be unwise if, as our literature
review implies, this prior firm performance is influenced by prior
compensation practices.
To control omitted organization-specific causes of financial
performance that remain stable in the short-run (e.g. product demand,
technology, legal framework, employee attributes), a fixed effects or
within groups model (e.g., Hausman & Taylor, 1981; for an application,
see Gerhart, 1988) was estimated by including organization dummies in
the equation.
Finally, because long-term incentives are designed to foster
better business performance over the longer run, average ROA over a
time period of three years or more was used as the dependent variable.
Again, average residuals from equation (1) were used for the
compensation variables. For an organization to be included, at least
two observations (Mean = 3.7) during this period were required, the
first of which had to be in 1981 or 1982 (N = 159). The model was:
ROAi. = Incentiveit-1G + Zit-1H + ei.. (5)
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RESULTS
Organization Effects on Individual Pay
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics using individual employees
as the units of analysis. For several variables exhibiting nonnormal
distributions, a natural logarithm ("Ln") transformation was used. The
means for these variables in raw (1980) dollars were $4.9 billion for
firm sales, $1.8 billion for unit sales, and $71,155 for base salary.
The mean number of employees was 34,378. The average firm in our
sample would place approximately 105th in the 1985 Fortune 500 (using
1985 dollars and data). ROA in our sample (6.1%) was the same as the
average for the 1985 Fortune 500. Thus, although our sample is not
random, it appears typical of the Fortune 500 in some key respects.
------------------------------------
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
------------------------------------
Hypothesis 1 stated that base pay level and pay mix would be
related to human capital and job responsibility level. Table 2, which
provides results that explain differences in pay between employees
across organizations during the 5 year period of the study, shows that
human capital and job attributes (row A) explain statistically
significant amounts of variance in base pay level (R2 = .690),
bonus/base (R2 = .238), and incentive eligibility (R2 = .205). Thus,
hypothesis 1 is supported.
According to Hypothesis 2, organizations should differ in their
base pay and pay mix, even after controlling for human capital and job
factors. To assess the total effect of organizations on each
compensation outcome, the organization dummy variables were added to
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the equation that already included human capital and job attributes.
The total organization effect (row B) is again statistically
significant for base pay level (R2 change
=
.138), bonus/base (R2
change =.214), and long-term incentive eligibility (R2
= .342). Thus,
there is support for Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 stated that an organization effect on employee pay
outcomes could be explained, in part, by specific organization
differences in industry, size, and financial performance. Row C of
Table 2 reports the incremental R-squares obtained with the
organization dummy variables removed and specific organization
characteristics added to the equation controlling for human capital and
job attributes. The last column of Table 2 reports the percentage of
the total organization effect explained by the specific organization
characteristics. For both base pay level and pay mix, industry, size,
and financial performance explain an important portion of the general
organization effect, consistent with hypothesis 3.
Table 3 reports regression coefficients for the equation
containing all independent variables except the organization dummies.
Of note is the fact that pay was positively related to size (LN sales
and LN number of employees) and, consistent with Deckop's (1988)
findings, profitability. A 1 point increase in ROA was associated with
base pay higher by .2% ($142), bonus/base higher by .5% ($355), and a
.006 higher probability of long-term incentive use. A 1 percent
increase in firm sales was associated with a .1% ($71) higher base
salary, a 1.6% ($1,138) higher bonus/base, and a .031 lower probability
of long-term incentive use.5
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The lower probability of incentives in larger firms (measured
using sales) is consistent with Balkin and Gomez-Mejia's (1987)
results, and also perhaps with the idea that incentives play more of a
role in start-up firms than in declining firms (Ellig, 1981).6 On the
other hand, the other measure of pay mix, the bonus to base ratio, is
actually lower in smaller firms. One explanation is that small firms
more often have growth as a primary objective. Long-term investments
to achieve growth are enhanced by adequate short-term cash-flow and
incentives that encourage a long-term perspective. Although long-term
incentives are consistent with these needs, short-run (typically
annual) bonuses, in contrast, would not be helpful in protecting short-
term cash flow or encouraging a long-term orientation.
------------------------------------
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here
-------------------------------------
Stability and Convergent Validity
Hypothesis 4 suggested that observed organization differences
would be stable over time. The earlier finding (see Table 2) that the
organization dummy variables had significant effects on base pay level
and pay mix over a 5-year period provides important support for this
hypothesized stability in organization compensation practices.
However, as an alternative approach, Table 4 reports stability
estimates for the compensation outcomes using firm averages in 1981 and
1985. The first column is the unadjusted correlation between these
firm averages in 1981 and 1985. A key finding is the fairly high
stability of organization effects over the four year period for base
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pay level (r = .85) and long-term incentive eligibility (r
=
.70). A
partial exception to the general pattern of stability is the case of
bonus/base, for which the correlation (r
=
.52) is somewhat lower. The
second column of Table 4 indicates that controlling for human capital
and job attributes (i.e. "adjusted") left the stability results largely
unchanged (again, bonus/base is the exception). This stability is all
the more striking when one considers that less than 50% of the
employees included by firms in the survey in 1981 were also included by
the same firms reporting in 1985. As such, we have strong evidence of
stability in at least two key aspects of the compensation packages of
employees that is due to stability in compensation policies and
practices, as opposed to stability in the people,? supporting
Hypothesis 4.
Although the bonus to base ratio exhibited less stability, this is
not surprising. As Table 3 indicated, bonus payouts are closely linked
to ROA. The stability of ROA over the 5-year period is only .09.
Given the instability in this key determinant (and perhaps in other
determinants also) of bonus payments, it would be surprising (perhaps
troubling) to find much greater stability in the bonus to base ratio.
After all, bonuses are used to make pay a variable, rather than a fixed
cost. Bonus payments that do not change from year to year with changes
in performance are, in effect, nothing more than base pay.8
The next question is in which areas of compensation do strategy
differences appear most pronounced? Hypothesis 5 suggests that it is
in the area of pay mix. Referring again to Table 2, two relevant
findings emerge. First, although it is clear that the organization
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effect is smallest for base pay level (R2 change
= .138), the
organization characteristics are best able to account for this effect
(R2 change = .094), explaining 68% of it. In contrast, the larger
organization effects for the pay mix dependent variables appear to be
less attributable to industry. size, and financial performance with 37%
and 34 % of the organization effects for bonus/base and incentive
eligibility being explained, respectively. These findings suggest that
the most significant differences in firm compensation decisions have to
do with pay mix, rather than pay level, consistent with Hypothesis 5.
Even similar organizations appear to follow very different pay mix
strategies.
According to hypothesis 6, actual compensation outcomes should
converge with reported policies. The correlation between pay level
(defined here as base + bonus) average residuals and reported pay level
policies was .504, indicating that firms with total pay leading
(following) other firms tended to report a lead (follow) policy. In
other words, our empirically derived measure of pay level demonstrates
convergent validity with the self-report measure. This convergence
provides direct support for Hypothesis 6 and thus the existence of
intended (in addition to realized) pay level strategies.9
------------------------------------
Insert Tables 5, 6, and 7 about here
------------------------------------
Consequences for Organization Performance
The results reported in Tables 5, 6, and 7 use the organization as
the unit of analysis, allowing an examination of the breadth and
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diversity of pay practices across organizations. As Table 5 indicates,
the mean of the bonus/base ratio was .20 and ranged from .00 to .67.
Based on supplemental data not fully analyzed here, approximately 95%
of the organizations used either corporate/division performance or a
combination of corporate/division and individual performance as the
basis for bonus payouts. The mean firm base pay level (in 1980
dollars) was $70,235 and ranged from $26,155 to $254,000. Finally, the
majority of employees were eligible for long-term incentives (mean =
.58), although organizations in our sample ranged from having none of
their surveyed employees on long-term incentives to having all such
employees on long-term incentive plans. Finally, the 25th and 75th
percentile values for the three compensation variables indicate fairly
normal distributions.
The estimates for the model of yearly return on assets appear in
Table 6. In no case is the coefficient for base pay level
statistically significant, refuting Hypothesis 7, which stated that pay
level and organization performance would be positively related. In
contrast, the coefficient for bonus/base is statistically significant
in the first three specifications. Even using the within-organization
(or fixed effects) model that includes a dummy variable for each
organization, the coefficient indicates that an increase in bonus/base
of 10 percentage points is associated with an approximately 0.48
percent higher return on assets. These findings provide tentative
support for Hypothesis 8, which stated that higher proportions of
variable pay would be associated with better organization performance.
Note, however, that controlling for prior return on assets,
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reduces the coefficients and their statistical significance. It is not
clear how to interpret this result, however. On the one hand, it may
suggest that the use of bonuses is spuriously related to subsequent
performance by virtue of the fact that performance is correlated over
time. On the other hand, one of the reasons that performance is
correlated in the short-run may stem from the effectiveness of the
bonus payouts (i.e. contingent pay). If the latter, one should not
control for prior financial performance. Note also that the within-
organization or fixed effects model controls for any factor that does
not change over time. In this sense, any stable organization
differences in profitability levels would be controlled, even without
explicitly including lagged ROA in the model. Thus, care must be taken
not to overcontrol.7 As such, we are inclined to lend greater weight
to the equations that exclude prior ROA.
The results for the use of long-term incentives appear in Table 7.
Recall that the longer term focus suggested the use of the mean return
on assets for the firm during the course of the study period. Using
this measure, there is fairly consistent support across model
specifications for the interpretation that the use of long-term
incentives at the beginning of the period was associated with higher
subsequent mean return on assets. Specifically, an increase in 10
percentage points in the number of eligible executives was associated
with 0.17% to 0.20 % higher mean return on assets. These results
provide further support for the prediction that a strategy of high
variable pay is associated with better organization performance
(Hypothesis 8).
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DISCUSSION
Our focus has been on the determinants and consequences of
organizations' compensation practices. Based on the compensation
strategy literature, we identified pay level and pay mix as key aspects
of compensation. On the determinants side, we began by comparing two
basic models. The first model, based on classical economic theory,
human capital theory, and job-oriented theories (e.g., Thurow, 1975),
hypothesized that compensation (particularly base pay level) was a
function of employee and job characteristics. Although the theoretical
and empirical literature on pay mix determinants is comparatively thin,
a similar model was taken as a starting point for pay mix.
The second general model was based largely on the compensation
strategy and contingency theory literatures, which emphasize that
environmental factors (e.g., industry, size, financial performance) may
influence pay system design, but that considerable discretion also
exists in such decisions. Thus, although employee and job factors (and
the just-mentioned environmental factors) were incorporated in this
second model, it was additionally hypothesized that knowing which
organization an employee worked for would significantly increase the
ability to explain pay level and pay mix. This second model was
supported, suggesting that theories focusing only on individual, job,
and environmental factors are not sufficient for explaining
organization differences in compensation practices.
Several types of evidence led us to interpret these unexplained
organization differences as indicative of strategic-like differences.
First, organization effects on compensation were significant over a 5-
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year period, suggesting that organization differences were persistent.
Second, test-retest correlations generally yielded a similar picture of
stability, although the bonus to base ratio was less stable than either
base payor long-term incentive eligibility. The lower stability of
bonus payments makes sense, however, because unlike base pay, bonuses
are designed to be variable from year to year. As noted, repeated
observations over an extended period did bear out persistent
organization differences in bonus usage.
Third, where data were available (i.e., for pay level), evidence
of significant convergence of pay strategy measures was also found. We
wish to emphasize, however, that a lower level of convergence would not
necessarily be of great concern. The two different measures may be
appropriate for different purposes. However, it seems reasonable to
assume that it is actual compensation outcomes, rather than management
perceptions, that determine costs and impact on employee attitudes and
behaviors. Given this focus, differences in actual compensation
outcomes would seem to be the more appropriate indicators of
differences in compensation strategy.
Fourth, pay mix (but not pay level) was positively related to
subsequent firm financial performance. Both the general strategy and
compensation strategy literatures argue that a defining characteristic
of strategic decisions is that they have consequences for firm
performance. In this sense, pay mix was found to be a more strategic
aspect of compensation. In summary, these four types of evidence
suggest that even highly similar organizations may follow different pay
strategies that have different degrees of success.
findings, in contrast, also speak directly to the question of whether
compensation decisions have consequences for subsequent performance.
OUr finding that short term bonus usage is linked to subsequent
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OUr work builds on previous research in several ways. For
example, the beneficial effect of contingent pay on organization
performance is consistent with experimental research on the impact of
individual incentives on individual performance in predominantly manual
activities (see Lawler, 1981; Dyer & Schwab, 1982 for reviews) and with
a recent single firm study of managers (Kahn & Sherer, 1990). Our
findings also extend the research on executive pay, which have tended
to focus on only a few top executives (usually only those for whom pay
information is publicly available in a prospectus) in each
organization. In addition, while most of the executive pay research
has examined whether pay was related to previous firm performance, our
performance is consistent with recent studies (Leonard, 1990; Abowd,
1990). In addition, our work also suggests that making more employees
eligible for long-term incentives is also associated with higher
subsequent organization performance in the longer run.
Although the economics literature has tended to focus on
individual characteristics and to some degree, industry differences,
like Groshen (1988), we found that the organization makes a substantial
difference in models of pay level determination. Thus, as with much
previous work (Brown, 1980), our research provides little in the way of
support for compensating wage differentials theory. Further,
consistent with arguments by Rynes and Milkovich (1986), our findings
also suggest that economists' traditional focus on industry differences
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(in pay level) is also not sufficient for explaining organization
differences (within industries). (See Dickens & Katz, 1987 for a
review of industry wage studies.) In the case of pay mix, comparisons
with previous research are difficult because important studies (e.g.,
Groshen) did not study pay mix.
In fact, despite the heavy focus on pay level in previous
compensation field research, at least two of our findings suggest that
pay mix deserves as much or more attention than pay level. First,
organization differences in pay mix were not only larger than those for
base pay level, but they were also less well explained by industry,
size, and financial performance. Second, as mentioned, pay mix was
related to subsequent financial performance, whereas pay level was not.
These findings raise the following questions. Why were pay mix
differences greater and why was pay mix, but not pay level, related to
subsequent financial performance?
The finding that organizations differentiated themselves more in
terms of pay mix than pay level is consistent with the argument that
organizations have less flexibility in pay level decisions. Standard
economic theories of competitive markets suggest that there are strong
forces that work to limit discretion in the setting of pay levels.
Increases in pay level lead, ceteris paribus, to product price
increases, and thus reduced competitiveness. Decreases in pay level
may result in difficulties such as less successful employee attraction
and retention (and thus perhaps lower employee quality) and union
activity. In contrast, although pay mix changes may also face costs
and roadblocks (e.g., administrative burdens, resistance to change),
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substantial changes in pay mix without dramatic changes in monetary or
behavioral costs may be possible.
In asking why pay mix, but not pay level, was related to
subsequent financial performance, two factors seem relevant. First,
there may simply be insufficient variation in organization pay levels
to establish such a link. For reasons just discussed, the consequences
associated with paying too little or too much may be so serious that
organizations avoid risking experimentation with different pay level
strategies. In contrast, the risks associated with changes in pay mix
may be less obvious, whereas the potential benefits are widely
discussed. For example, both expectancy theory and agency theory
suggest that employee pay contingencies affect the goals achieved. By
making pay variable and dependent on the achievement of specific
individual and organization goals, the theories predict that these
goals are more likely to be realized.
Similarly, in discussions of what organizations need to do to
become more competitive, business strategy books often recommend that
changes to the pay mix (usually toward greater variable pay) be
considered (e.g., Kanter, 1989; Peters, 1987). According to Kanter,
for example:
there is a movement afoot in many companies to both control
costs and motivate performance targeted to strategic
objectives by changing the pay system to one with lower fixed
wages and salaries but higher variable earnings
opportunities. (p. 264).
Several caveats should be kept in mind in interpreting our
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findings. First, although our results suggest discretion in
compensation design, it is difficult to separate differences due to
intended strategy, culture, ongoing coalition bargaining, and
historical accident. Our focus on realized strategies (Mintzberg,
1978) is not conducive to measuring the relative role of each. On the
other hand, our estimates of the net effect of organization differences
(and thus perhaps strategy effects) on pay decisions are probably on
the conservative side because our control for different distributions
of jobs and personal attributes ignores the possibility that these
distributions may themselves be outcomes of conscious human resource
strategies.
Second, the positive relation between variable pay and subsequent
ROA needs to be interpreted with caution. After some point, greater
pay variability may have diminishing returns or even adverse effects.
In addition, recall that our sample was composed of fairly high level
employees, a group with relatively large amounts of decision-making
power and potential impact on organization performance. Even among
these high level employees, pay was often partly contingent on
individual performance, rather than completely dependent on
organization performance. As one moves down the organization
hierarchy, employee impact diminishes. Thus, although making pay
contingent on general organization performance may help achieve short-
run cost objectives, expectancy theory, for example, suggests that such
a plan is less likely to achieve behavioral objectives at lower job
levels. Gain-sharing plans, which focus on the performance of smaller
organization units might be a more viable option (Schuster, 1986)
ROA. As such, it is not clear that any single factor would be likely
have a "large" effect on ROA. Even small effects, however, may be
substantial in dollar terms.
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Finally, although the point estimates of the relation between ROA
and compensation outcomes could be described as "small", it is
necessary to keep in mind that many factors determine an organization's
Future Research
At this stage of our work, we were able to examine a measure of
financial performance (i.e. ROA), but not shareholder wealth. Although
the two types of measures are likely to be related, future research
using shareholder wealth (e.g., Abowd, 1990), as well as other measures
of financial performance would be useful. More broadly, organization
effectiveness can be defined in terms of many other dimensions (e.g.
survival, adaptability, stakeholder satisfaction).
Future compensation research should also keep in mind that
compensation decisions are only one (albeit important) aspect of
general human resource strategy (Dyer & Holder, 1989). It would be of
interest, for example, to determine whether certain types of
compensation strategies tend to be associated with particular types of
selection, development, and employment stability systems. Further, it
would be useful to know which combinations work best under different
sets of conditions. As one example, does a high pay level work best
when combined with an effective external staffing and performance
management system? The logic would be that hiring mistakes would be
especially costly when pay levels are high. On the other hand, a high
pay level can drive down selection ratios. Combined with a valid
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selection system, it may be an effective means of "creaming" the
applicant pool (e.g., Rynes & Barber, forthcoming; Bronfenbrenner,
1956) . Holzer's (1990) model may provide a starting point for
comparing the costs and benefits of different pay level policies.
Although our study examined both change and stability in
compensation decisions, a more in depth examination of the reasons for
each would be of potential value. For example, even though our fixed
effects model provided valuable information on the effects of changes
in compensation variables, future research that examines in more detail
the reasons for such changes and whether they are typically accompanied
by changes in other human resource practices would be of interest.
It would also be useful to examine cases where compensation
strategies remain the same even when environmental changes might
suggest that changes would be advisable. In investigations of this
sort, institutional theory may provide a useful framework. In essence,
institutional theory argues that "organizations are influenced by
normative pressures" arising from either the internal or external
environment that "lead the organization to be guided by legitimated
elements" such as standard operating procedures, professional
certifications, and the like (Zucker, 1987, p. 443). These legitimated
ways of doing things may, however, continue long after the reason for
their implementation is gone. In fact, resistance to change may be a
consequence of institutionalization. But as Eisenhardt (1988) has
demonstrated in examining retail compensation practices, it can be
difficult to demonstrate that institutionalization is the reason for a
lack of change. In her study, for example, agency theory accounted for
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION
38
many findings as well as institutional theory did. Nevertheless, there
may be additional applications of the latter in compensation.1O
As one example, consider the choice of emphasizing internal
consistency versus market pricing. One view is that internal
consistency is often given great weight in many organizations, despite
changes in the business environment that argue against such an emphasis
(e.g., Kanter, 1989; Levine, 1989; Lawler, 1986). It is argued, for
example, that internal consistency (and associated bureaucratic support
mechanisms like job evaluation) came into being at a time when
"oligopolistic bureaucracies" operated in a more stable world (Kanter,
p. 265). With increasing global competition and environmental
turbulence, this view holds that such an approach no longer makes
sense. Internal consistency is seen as a costly luxury that continues
to be emphasized because it has become institutionalized.
Finally, despite our focus on pay level and pay mix, there are
many other potentially strategic aspects of compensation, for which we
have little evidence on organization differences or possible
performance consequences. For example, do otherwise similar
organizations use different pay hierarchies? How does the basis for
pay differ across organizations? What accounts for these variations?
In cases where performance is the basis, are particular combination of
performance criteria (e.g., individual, group, unit, organization) more
effective than others? If so, under what circumstances? We hope our
study provides a useful framework for examining such issues.
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION
39
REFERENCES
Abowd, J.M. (1990). Does performance-based managerial compensation affect
corporate performance? Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, 52S-
73S.
Baker, G.P., Jensen, M.C., & Murphy, K.J. (1988). Compensation and
incentives: Practice vs. theory. Journal of Finance, 43, 593-616
Balkin, D. B., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1987). Toward a contingent theory of
compensation strategy. Strategic Management Journal, ~, 169-182.
Becker, G. (1975). Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis,
with special reference to education. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2nd edition.
Belcher, D., & Atchinson, T. (1987). Compensation administration.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Brealey, R. & Myers, S. (1981). Principles of corporate finance. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Bronfenbrenner, M. (1956). Potential monopsony in labor markets.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ~, 577-588.
Brown, C. (1980). Equalizing differences in the labor market. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 94, 113-134.
Brown, C. & Medoff, J. (1989). The employer size-wage effect. Journal of
Political Economy, 97, 1027-1053.
Chrisman, J.J., Hofer, C.W., & Boulton, W.R. (1988). Toward a system of
classifying business strategies. Academy of Management Review, 13,
413-428.
Conference Board. (1989). Variable pay gains ground. Human Resources,
~(8), 1.
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION
40
Deckop, J.R. (1988). Determinants of chief executive officer compensation.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 41, 215-226.
Dickens, W.T. & Katz, L.F. (1987). Inter-industry wage differences and
theories of wage determination. National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working paper #2271.
Doeringer, P.B. & Piore, M.J. (1971). Labor markets and manpower analysis.
Lexington, MA: Heath.
Dunlop, J.T. (1957). Suggestions toward a reformulation of wage theory.
Reprinted in Mahoney.
Dyer, L. & Holder, G.W. (1989). A strategic perspective of human resource
management. In L. Dyer (Ed.), Human Resource Management--Evolving
Roles and Responsibilities. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National
Affairs, Volume 1.
Dyer, L. & Schwab, D.P. (1982). Personnel/human resource management
research. In T.A. Kochan, D.J.B. Mitchell, & L. Dyer (Eds.),
Industrial relations research in the 1970s: Review and appraisal.
Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association.
Eaton, J. & Rosen, H. (1983). Agency, delayed compensation, and the
structure of executive renumeration. Journal of Finance, ~, 1489-
1507.
Ehrenberg, R. G., & Milkovich, G. T. (1987). Compensation and firm
performance. In M. Kleiner et al. (Eds). Madison, WI: Industrial
Relations Research Association.
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1988). Agency- and institutional-theory explanations: The
case of retail sales compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 31,
488-511.
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION
41
Ellig, B. R. (1981). Compensation elements: Market phase determines the
Compensation Review, (Third Quarter), 30-38.mix.
Evans, D.S. & Leighton, L.S. (1989). Why do smaller firms pay less?
Journal of Human Resources, 24, 299-318.
Foster, K.E. (1985). An anatomy of company pay practices. Personnel, 1985.
Gerhart, B. (1988). Sources of variance in incumbent perceptions of job
complexity. Journal of Applied Psychology, 73, 154-162.
Gerhart, B. & Milkovich, G.T. (1989). Salaries, salary growth, and
promotions of men and women in a large, private firm. In R. Michael,
H. Hartmann, & B. O'Farrell (Eds.), Pay equity: Empirical inquiries.
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Gerhart, B. & Milkovich, G.T. (1988). Organizational differences in
managerial compensation practices. Center for Advanced Human Resource
Studies, Cornell University, Working Paper, #88-19.
Gomez-Mejia, L.R. (1987). The relationship between organizational strategy,
pay strategy, and compensation effectiveness: An exploratory study.
College of Business, University of Colorado, Working paper.
Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Tosi, H., & Hinkin, T. (1987). Managerial control,
performance, and executive compensation. Academy of Management
Journal, 30, 51-70.
Gomez-Mejia, L.R. & Welbourne, T.M. (1988). Compensation strategy: An
overview and future steps. Human Resource Planning, !!, 173-189.
Groshen, E.L. (1988). Why do wages vary among employers? Economic Review,
24, 19-38.
Hausman, J.A. & Taylor, W.E. (1981). Panel data and unobservable individual
effects. Econometrica, 49, 1377-1398.
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION
42
Heneman, H.G. III. (1985). Pay satisfaction. Research in Personnel and
Human Resource Management, ~, 115-139.
Hewitt Associates. (July 1989). Preliminary report, leading edge
compensation study. Rowayter, Connecticut.
Hofer, C.W. & Schendel, D.E. (1978). Strategy formulation: Analytical
concepts. St. Paul, MN: West.
Holzer, H.J. (1990). Wages, employer costs, and employee performance in the
firm. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, 147S-164S.
Hunter, J.E. & Hunter, R.F. (1984). Validity and utility of alternative
predictors of job performance. Psychological Bulletin, 96, 72-98.
Kahn, L.M. & Sherer, P.D. (1990). Contingent pay and managerial
performance. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, 107S-120S.
Kanter, R.M. (1989). When giants learn to dance. New York: Simon and
Schuster.
Kerr, J. & Bettis, R.A. (1987). Board of directors, top management
compensation, and shareholder returns. Academy of Management Journal,
30, 645-665.
Krueger, A.B. & Summers, L.H. (1988). Efficiency wages and the inter-
industry wage structure. Econometrica, 56, 259-293.
Krueger, A.B. & Summers, L.H. (1986). Reflections on the inter-industry
wage structure. In K. Lang & J. Leonard (Eds.), Unemployment and the
structure of labor markets. London: Basil Blackwell.
Lawler, E. E. (1981). Pay and organizational development. Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley.
Lawler, E.E. III. (1986). What's wrong with point-factor job evaluation.
Compensation and Benefits Review, 20-28.
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION
43
Leonard, J.S. (1990). Executive pay and firm performance. Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, 43, 13S-29S.
Leonard, J.S. (1988). Wage structure and dynamics in the electronics
industry. Industrial Relations, 28, 251-275.
Lester, R.A. (1946). Wage diversity and its theoretical consequences.
Review of Economics and Statistics, 28, 152-159.
Levine, H.Z. (1987). Compensation and benefits today: Board members speak
out, Part 1. Compensation and Benefits Review, 23-40.
Livernash, E.R. (1957). The internal wage structure. In G.W. Taylor & F.C.
Pierson (Eds.), New concepts in wage determination. New York: McGraw-
Hill.
Mahoney, T. A. (1979). Compensation and reward perspectives. Homewood,
IL: Irwin.
Mellow, W. (1982 ) . Employer size and wages. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 64, 495-501.
Miles, R.E. & Snow, C.C. (1978). Organizational strategy, structure, and
process. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Milkovich, G. T. (1988). A strategic perspective on compensation
management. Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management, ~,
263-288.
Milkovich, G.T. & Rabin, B.R. (forthcoming). Firm performance: Does
executive compensation really matter? In F. Foulkes (Ed.), Executive
compensation in the 1990s: A strategic approach. Harvard Business
School Press.
Milkovich, G. T., & Newman, J. (1987). Compensation (2nd ed.), Plano, TX:
Business Publications Inc.
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION
44
Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, experience, and earnings. New York, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Mintzberg, H. (1987). Crafting strategy. Harvard Business Review, July-
August, 66-75.
Mintzberg, H. (1978). Patterns in strategy formation. Management Science,
24, 934-948.
Murphy, K.J. (1985). Corporate performance and managerial renumeration: An
empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics,-Z, 11-42.
O'Dell, C. (1987). People, performance, and pay. American Productivity
Center.
Pearce, J.A. II & Robinson, R.B. Jr. (1982). Formulation and implementation
of competitive strategy. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
Peters, T. (1987). Thriving on chaos. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Reynolds, L.G. (1946). Wage differences in local labor markets. American
Economic Review, 36, 366-375.
Rynes, S.L. & Barber, A.E. (forthcoming). Applicant attraction strategies:
An organizational perspective. Academy of Management Review.
Rynes, S.L. & Milkovich, G.T. (1986). Wage surveys: Dispelling some myths
about the "market wage." Personnel Psychology, 39, 71-90.
Schwab, D.P. (1980). Job evaluation and pay-setting: Concepts and
practices. In E.R. Livernash (Ed.), Comparable worth: Issues and
alternatives. Washington, D.C.: Equal Employment Advisory Council.
Segal, M. (1986). Post-institutionalism in labor economics: The forties and
fifties revisited. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 39, 388-403.
Shapiro, C. & Stiglitz, J.E. (1984). Equilibrium unemployment as a worker
discipline device. American Economic Review, 74, 433-444.
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION
45
Schuster, M. (1986). Gainsharing: The state of the art. Compensation and
Benefits Management, ~, 285-290.
Smith, A. (1937). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of
nations. New York: Random House.
Snow, C.C. & Hambrick, D.C. (1980). Measuring organizational strategies:
Some theoretical and methodological problems. Academy of Management
Review, ~, 527-538.
Thurow, L. (1975). Generating inequality. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
Tosi, H.L. Jr. & Gomez-Mejia, L.R. (1989). The decoupling of CEO pay and
performance: An agency theory perspective. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 34, 169-189.
Weber, C. & Rynes, S. (1990). Effects of compensation strategy on job pay
decisions. Working Paper #89-06 (revised), Center for Advanced Human
Resource Studies, Cornell University.
Williamson, O.E., Wachter, M.L., & Harris, J.E. (1975). Understanding the
employment relation: The analysis of idiosyncratic exchange. Bell
Journal of Economics, ~, 250-280.
Zucker, L.G. (1987). Institutional theories of organization. American
Review of Sociology, 13, 443-464.
FOOTNOTES
1.Information on the usage of specific types of long-term incentive
plans was not available. However, in a separate survey (to which we
did not have access), many of the same respondents were asked to
provide information on the following plans: incentive stock options,
non-qualified stock options, stock appreciation plans, performance
plans, restricted stock, and phantom stock. Thus, our dichotomous
long-term incentive eligibility measure was probably answered with
these standard types of programs in mind.
2. In cases where a direct measure of years in the labor force is not
available, this formula is used in the economics literature to estimate
the number of years that a person could have participated in the labor
force.
3. ROA was defined as net income divided by assets. Other definitions
are also possible (e.g. earnings before interest, but after taxes
divided by assets, see Brealey & Myers, 1981). Any biasing effect of a
particular definition should be eliminated by the fixed effects model
(described below) to the extent the bias remains stable over time.
Moreover, recall our formula yielded an average ROA in our sample that
was the same as that of the Fortune 500.
4. The industry distribution is available from the authors.
5. Note that in a log-linear specification, multiplying the coefficient
by 100 gives the percent change in the dependent variable associated
with a unit change in the independent variable. In a log-log
specification, the coefficient gives the percent change in the
dependent variable for a 1 percent change in the independent variable.
6.Long-term incentives are thought to facilitate growth, a high
priority objective in many small firms, by encouraging a long-term
perspective and not depriving the organization of cash flow, which is
necessary for investment. Short-term annual bonus plans do not
accomplish the same objectives. Therefore, it is not surprising that
this aspect of pay mix is not prevalent in small firms.
7. Although the same employees may not be present, a stability in human
resource practices (e.g. hiring criteria) may result in a similar set
of employee attributes.
8.The long-term incentive eligibility measure is more stable because it
does not measure actual payments. Also, recall that Table 2 showed
significant organization effects on the bonus to base ratio. The
implication may be that real organization differences in bonus usage
can be more accurately measured over longer observation periods because
fluctuations in firm performance measures (e.g., ROA) tend to cancel
out. In contrast, correlations between single year observations are
likely to be constrained because they are highly susceptible to such fluctuations.
9.Because the self-report measure is based on a single respondent and a
single item, its reliability is not likely to be high. Thus, our
reported correlation of .504 is likely to be an underestimate of the
true convergence.
10.We should note, of course, that the idea that certain customs and
practices may become institutionalized, is not completely new in the
study of compensation. As mentioned earlier, this was a central theme
of the work of the so-called post-institutional economists of the 1940s
and 1950s (Segal, 1986).
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics, Individual Level
VARIABLE
Firm and Unit Characteristics
Return on assets (ROA)
Ln Firm sales. (SALES)
Ln Unit sales. (USALES)
Ln Number of employees. (EMP)
Individual Characteristics
Ln base pay
Bonus/base
Long-term incentive eligibility
Education (EDUC)
Potential experience (EXP)
Potential experience squared (EXPSQ)
Firm tenure (TEN)
Firm tenure squared (TENSQ)
Job tenure (JOBTEN)
Job tenure squared (JOBTENSQ)
Job Characteristics
Management levels reporting (LEVREP)
Levels from board = 1 (LEV1)
Levels from board = 2 (LEV2)
Levels from board = 3 (LEV3)
[continued]
MEAN
STANDARD
DEVIATION
6.129 5.070
14.327 1.286
12.634 2.006
9.818 1.259
11. 031 .492
.180 .177
.601 .490
16.408 1.889
25.344 9.025
723.765 469.462
15.098 10.474
337.657 393.055
4.219 4.085
34.487 97.868
2.287 2.024
.010 .102
.063 .242
.199 .399
Levels from board = 4 (LEV4) .313 .464
Levels from board = 5 (LEV5) .249 .432
Levels from board = 6 (LEV6) .122 .327
Levels from board = 7 (LEV7) .044 .205
TABLE 1 (continued)
Note: Number of observations = 70,684; All dollar values were
adjusted using the Consumer Price Index to be in 1980 dollars.
ALn
= natural logarithm
MODEL R2 R2 CHANGE'" C/Bb
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = BASE PAY
A. HC, LEVEL .690
B. HC, LEVEL, ORGDUM .828 .138
C. HC, LEVEL, ORGCHAR .784 .094 68.1%
A. HC, LEVEL .238
B. HC, LEVEL, ORGDUM .452 .214
C. HC, LEVEL, ORGCHAR .318 .080 37.4%
A. HC, LEVEL .205
B. HC, LEVEL, ORGDUM .547 .342
C. HC, LEVEL, ORGCHAR .322 .117 34.2%
TABLE 2
Organization Effects on Compensation Outcomes
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = BONUS/BASE PAY
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = LONG-TERM INCENTIVE ELIGIBILITY
Note: All R2 and changes are statistically significant at p < .001.
Models A, B, and C correspond to text equations 1, 2, and 3,
respectively.
"'Change in R2 relative to Model A.
bChange in R2 for Model C divided by change in R2 for Model B.
Ln BASE
COEFF
INTERCEPT 7.740
EDUC .041
EXP .023
EXPSQ
- .0003
TEN
- .003
TENSQ .0001
JOBTEN
- .003
JOBTENSQ .0001
LEVREP .105
LEV1 1.049
LEV2 .667
LEV3 .386
LEV4 .242
LEV5 .147
LEV6 .063
ROA .002
EMP .005
SALES .100
USALES .019
R2
TABLE 3
Model of Individual Pay Outcomes
BONUS/BASE
T-VALUE COEFF
LONG-TERM INCENTIVE
ELIGIBILITY
T-VALUE COEFF T-VALUE
-32.5
28.1
13.6
- 9.3
1.3
.7
-12.8
4.4
58.9
11.8
41.4
45.7
39.8
30.8
11.8
19.5
21.1
- 7.1
2.5
.322
Note: Each equation also includes dummies variables for year and industry.
Number of observations = 70,694
413.6 -.451
77.0 .006
43.9 .001
-24.9 .000
- 9.2 .004
9.2 -.0001
- 9.0 .001
3.6 -.000
198.2 .026
99.4 .151
110.2 .164
77 .6 .106
52.1 .067
32.2 .039
13.1 .013
9.2 .005
2.3 .010
40.8 .016
31.5 -.003
.784
-37.6 -1.074
18.4 .026
2.7 .012
.4 -.0002
18.0 .001
-15.0 -.0000
4.8 -.008
- 5.1 .0001
76.0 .055
22.4 .221
42.1 .442
33.2 .402
22.5 .327
13.3 .249
4.2 .100
42.6 .006
6.5 .086
10.0 -.031
- 7.5 .003
.318
UNADJUSTEDa ADJUSTEDh
BASE PAY .85 .85
BONUS/BASE .52 .31
INCENTIVE ELIGIBILITY .70 .68
TABLE 4
Stability of Compensation Outcomes
CORRELATION BETWEEN 1981 AND 1985
Note: Based on averages from 137 organizations reporting in both 1981
and 1985.
aBased on average of individual pay within each organization.
bBased on average of individual pay residuals from equation
containing human capital and job characteristics (see text).
Variable Mean SD 25th 75th Min Max
Base $70,235 $26,155 $51,000 $84,000 $28,000 $254,000
Bonus/Base .20 .14 .10 .28 .00 .67
Long-term Incentive .58 .36 .23 .92 .00 1.00
TABLE 5
Descriptive Statistics for Compensation Variables, Firm Level
Number of Observations
= 728 (on 219 firms)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = YEARLY RETURN ON ASSETS
EQUATION
VARIABLE ( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LAG BONUS/BASE 9.470++ 6.825++ 4.795+ 2.101 3.723
(5.3) (3.73) (1.9) (1.3) (1. 44 )
LAG BASE 0.586 .022 2.933 .186 2.605
( .6) (0.0) (1.1) (0.2) (1.0)
LAG ROA .451** .066*
(13.4) (1.7)
INDUSTRY NO YES NO YES NO
DUMMIES
EMPLOYER NO NO YES NO YES
DUMMIES
INTERCEPT 5.779** 7.196** 4.989** 3.448** 4.574*
(31.9) (12.0) (2.8) (5.7) (2.5)
R2.
.039 .214 .659 .376 .661
TABLE 6
Model of Yearly Return on Assets, Adjusted- Compensation Variables
Note: Number of Observations = 728 (on 219 firms).
parentheses.
T-values are in
-Based on average of individual pay residuals from equation
containing human capi~al and job characteristics (see text).
*
p < .05, two-tailed + P < .05, one-tailed
**
p < .01, two-tailed
++ p < .01, one-tailed
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = MEAN RETURN ON ASSETS
EQUATION
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4)
LONG-TERM INCENTIVE 1.896+ 1.657 1.996+ 1.838+
ELIGIBILITY
(1.8) (1.6) (1.9) (1.8)
LAG ROA .164** .093
(3.1) (1.6)
INDUSTRY DUMMIES NO NO YES YES
INTERCEPT 5.536** 4.355** 6.748** 5.739**
(16.6) (8.7) (6.6) (4.8)
R2
.021 .079 .311 .325
TABLE 7
Model of Mean Return on Assets, Adjusted- Compensation Variables
Note: Number of Observations
= 156 firms. T-values are in parentheses.
-Based on average of individual pay residuals from equation
containing human capital and job characteristics (see text).
*
p < .05, two-tailed + P < .05, one-tailed
**
p < .01, two-tailed
++ p < .01, one-tailed
